5.1. Why is it necessary to work on the basis of clues?
It is only natural that secret services do not disclose details of their work. Consequently there is,
at least officially, no statement by the foreign intelligence services of the UKUSA states that
they work together to operate a global interception system. The existence of such a system thus
needs to be proved by gathering as many clues as possible, thereby building up a convincing
body of evidence.
The trail of clues which constitutes evidence of this kind is made up of three elements:
- evidence that the foreign intelligence services in the UKUSA states intercept private and
business communications;
- evidence that interception stations operated by the UKUSA states are to be found in the
parts of the world where they would be needed in the light of the technical requirements
of the civilian satellite communication system;
- evidence that there is a closer than usual association between the intelligence services of
these states. For the purposes of proving the existence of such an association, it is
irrelevant whether this extends to the acceptance from partners of applications for the
interception of messages which are then forwarded to them in the form of unevaluated
raw material. This question is only relevant when investigating the hierarchies within
such an interception association.
5.1.1. Evidence of interception activity on the part of foreign intelligence services
At least in democracies, intelligence services work on the basis of laws which define their
purpose and/or powers. It is thus easy to prove that in many of these countries foreign
intelligence services exist which intercept civilian communications. This is true of the five
UKUSA states, which all operate such services. There is no need for specific additional proof
that any of these states intercept communications entering and leaving their territory. Satellite
communications also permit some intelligence communications intended for recipients abroad to
be intercepted from the countryís own territory. In none of the five UKUSA states is there any
legal impediment to intelligence services doing this. The logic underlying the method for the
strategic monitoring of foreign communications, and its at least partly overtly acknowledged
purpose, make it practically certain that the intelligence services do in fact use it to that end.